Index by Article Title


  1. R. R. Blake (2001). A Primer on binocular rivalry, including current controversies.
  2. Dawn M. McBride, B. Dosher (2002). A comparison of conscious and automatic memory processes for picture and word stimuli: A process dissocation analysis.
  3. Robert W. Mitchell (1997). Kinesthetic-visual matching, imitation, and self-recognition
  4. Jörg R. J. Schirra (1993). A contribution to reference semantics of spatial prepositions: The visualization problem and its solution in vitra.
  5. Francis Crick, Christof Koch (2003). A framework for consciousness.
  6. Melvin Fitting . A logic of explicit knowledge.
  7. Alain Morin (2004). A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness.
  8. Stanislas Dehaene, Michel Kerszberg, Jean-Pierre Changeux (2001). A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks.
  9. Shan Gao (2003). A possible quantum basis of panpsychism.
  10. Nancy J. Woolf (1997). A possible role for cholinergic neurons of the basal forebrain and pontomesencephalon in consciousness.
  11. Fu Chang . A theory of consciousness.
  12. Anthony Greenwald . A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept.
  13. Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Daniel M. Wolpert, Christopher D. Frith (2002). Abnormalities in the awareness of action.
  14. James A. Cheyne, Jonathan S. A. Carriere, Daniel Smilek (2006). Absent-mindedness: Lapses of conscious awareness and everyday cognitive failures.
  15. Juha Silvanto (2007). Abstract Making the blindsighted see.
  16. Shaun Nichols, Todd A. Grantham (2000). Adaptive complexity and phenomenal consciousness.
  17. Jaak Panksepp (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans.
  18. Sean A. Spence (2001). Alien control: From phenomenology to cognitive neurobiology.
  19. Ian Thornton, Diego Fernandez-Duque (2000). An implicit measure of undetected change.
  20. Amy Ione (2000). An inquiry into Paul cezanne: The role of the artist in studies of perception and consciousness.
  21. Manuel Bremer . Animal consciousness as a test case of cognitive science.
  22. Michael V. Antony . Are our concepts “conscious state” and “conscious creature” vague?
  23. Bill Faw (2006). Are we studying consciousness yet?
  24. Christopher D. Frith (2002). Attention to action and awareness of other minds.
  25. Robert W. Kentridge, Charles A. Heywood, Lawrence Weiskrantz (1999). Attention without awareness in blindsight.
  26. Daniel J. Simons (2000). Attentional capture and inattentional blindness.
  27. Michael Esterman, Regina McGlinchey-Berroth, Mieke Verfaellie, Laura Grande, Patrick Kilduff, William Milberg (2002). Aware and unaware perception in hemispatial neglect: Evidence from a stem completion priming task.
  28. Diego Fernandez-Duque, J. A. Baird, Michael I. Posner (2000). Awareness and metacognition.
  29. S. Makeig, T. Jung, Terrence J. Sejnowski (2000). Awareness during drowsiness: Dynamics and electrophysiological correlates.
  30. James W. Manns, R. Clark, L. R. Squire (2000). Awareness predicts the magnitude of single-cue trace eyeblink conditioning.
  31. Annalena Venneri, Michael F. Shanks (2004). Belief and awareness: Reflections on a case of persistent anosognosia.
  32. Patrik Vuilleumier, Sophie Schwartz (2001). Beware and be aware: Capture of spatial attention by fear-related stimuli iin neglect.
  33. Ulrich Mohrhoff . Beyond the cookie Cutter paradigm.
  34. Alva Noë, Luis Pessoa, Evan Thompson (2000). Beyond the grand illusion: What change blindness really teaches us about vision.
  35. David A. Leopold (1997). Brain Mechanisms of Visual Awareness: Using Perceptual Ambiguity to Investigate the Neural Basis of Image Segmentation and Grouping.
  36. Yasuki Hashimoto, Kuniyoshi L. Sakai (2003). Brain activations during conscious self-monitoring of speech production with delayed auditory feedback: An fMRI study.
  37. Roger W. Sperry (1964). Brain bisection and mechanisms of consciousness.
  38. Diego Fernandez-Duque (2001). Brain imaging of attentional networks in normal and pathological states.
  39. Alarik T. Arenander, Frederick T. Travis (2004). Brain patterns of self-awareness.
  40. Włodzisław Duch . Brain-inspired conscious computing architecture.
  41. Wayne M. Martin (2005). Bubbles and skulls: The phenomenological structure of self-consciousness in dutch still-life painting.
  42. Muriel Vandenberghe, Nicolas Schmidt, Patrick Fery, Axel Cleeremans (2006). Can amnesic patients learn without awareness? New evidence comparing deterministic and probabilistic sequence learning.
  43. Arnaud Destrebecqz, Axel Cleeremans (2001). Can sequence learning be implicit? New evidence with the process dissociation procedure.
  44. Peter Carruthers . Cartesian epistemology.
  45. Diego Fernandez-Duque (2002). Cause and effect theories of attention: The role of conceptual metaphors.
  46. Arnaud Destrebecqz, Philippe Peigneux, Steven Laureys, Christian Degueldre, Guy Del Fiore, Joel Aerts, Andre Luxen, Martial van der Linden, Axel Cleeremans, Pierre Maquet (2003). Cerebral correlates of explicit sequence learning.
  47. A. David Milner (1995). Cerebral correlates of visual awareness.
  48. Daniel T. Levin, Nausheen Momen, Sarah B. Drivdahl, Daniel J. Simons (2000). Change blindness blindness: The metacognitive error of overestimating change-detection ability.
  49. Axel Cleeremans . Change blindness to gradual changes in facial expressions.
  50. Ronald A. Rensink (2005). Change blindness: Implications for the nature of visual attention.
  51. Diego Fernandez-Duque, Ian Thornton (2000). Change detection without awareness: Do explicit reports underestimate the representation of change in the visual system?
  52. Stephen R. Mitroff, Daniel J. Simons (2000). Changes are not localized before they are explicitly detected.
  53. Alain Morin (1995). Characteristics of an effective internal dialogue in the acquisition of self-information.
  54. Murat Aydede, Guven Guzeldere (2004). Cognitive architecture, concepts, and introspection: An information-theoretic solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness.
  55. Jonathan Cohen, Shaun Nichols (2010). Colours, colour relationalism and the deliverances of introspection.
  56. Paolo Bartolomeo (2002). Commentary: Can attention capture visual awareness?
  57. Frank Tong (2001). Competing theories of binocular rivalry: A possible resolution.
  58. J. T. Enns, R. A. Rensink, V. Di Lollo (2000). Competition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes.
  59. Murat Aydede, Guzeldere Guven . Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.
  60. Shaun Nichols, Brian Fiala . Confabulation, confidence, and introspection.
  61. Craig Kunimoto, Jeff G. Miller, Harold Pashler (2001). Confidence and accuracy of near-threshold discrimination responses.
  62. Jörg R. J. Schirra . Connecting visual and verbal space: Preliminary considerations concerning the concept ‘mental image’.
  63. Flavio T. P. Oliveira, David Goodman (2004). Conscious and effortful or effortless and automatic: A practice-performance paradox in motor learning.
  64. Moshe Bar (2000). Conscious and nonconscious processing of visual object identity.
  65. Axel Cleeremans (2006). Conscious and unconscious cognition: A graded, dynamic perspective.
  66. Troy A. W. Visser, Philip M. Merikle (1999). Conscious and unconscious processes: The effects of motivation.
  67. Rajendra D. Badgaiyan (2005). Conscious awareness of retrieval: An exploration of the cortical connectivity.
  68. Peter Carruthers (2006). Conscious experience versus conscious thought.
  69. Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur, Claire Sergent (2006). Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy.
  70. E. Gonzalez, M. Broens, Pim Haselager (2004). Consciousness and agency: The importance of self-organized action.
  71. Susan J. Blackmore (2003). Consciousness in meme machines.
  72. Alain Morin (2007). Consciousness is more than wakefulness.
  73. Douglas F. Watt (2004). Consciousness, emotional self-regulation and the brain: Review article.
  74. Stuart R. Hameroff (2001). Consciousness, the brain, and space-time geometry.
  75. Nicholas Humphrey (2006). Consciousness: The Achilles heel of darwinism? Thank God, not quite.
  76. Marc Bekoff (2003). Considering animals–not higher primates.
  77. Ian Thornton, Diego Fernandez-Duque (2002). Converging evidence for the detection of change without awareness.
  78. Thomas Fuchs (2005). Corporealized and disembodied minds: A phenomenological view of the body in melancholia and schizophrenia.
  79. Ken Mogi . Creativity and the neural basis of qualia.
  80. L. Andrew Coward, Ron Sun (2004). Criteria for an effective theory of consciousness and some preliminary attempts.
  81. Daniel J. Simons (2000). Current approaches to change blindness.
  82. Sarah-Jane Blakemore (2003). Deluding the motor system.
  83. Derek Browne (2004). Do dolphins know their own minds?
  84. Noam Sagiv, Jeffrey Heer, Lynn Robertson (2006). Does binding of synesthetic color to the evoking grapheme require attention?
  85. Daniel Smilek, Jonathan Eastwood, Philip M. Merikle (2000). Does unattended information facilitate change detection?
  86. Anthony G. Greenwald, E. Spangenberg, A. R. Pratkanis, J. Eskenazi (1991). Double blind tests of subliminal self-help audiotapes.
  87. Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal (2009). Dual Aspect Framework for Consciousness and Its Implications: West meets East for Sublimation Process.
  88. Lionel Naccache, Stanislas Dehaene, L. Jonathan Cohen, Marie-Odile Habert, Elodie Guichart-Gomez, Damien Galanaud, Jean-Claude Willer (2005). Effortless control: Executive attention and conscious feeling of mental effort are dissociable.
  89. Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Ralph Adolphs (2007). Emotion and consciousness.
  90. John M. Gardiner (2002). Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: A first-person approach.
  91. E. Pronin, Daniel M. Wegner, K. McCarthy, S. Rodriguez (2006). Everyday magical powers: The role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence.
  92. Christophe Menant (2006). Evolution of representations and intersubjectivity as sources of the self. An introduction to the nature of self-consciousness (2006).
  93. Christophe Menant (2006). Evolution of representations. From basic life to self-representation and self-consciousness (2006).
  94. Diego Fernandez-Duque, J. A. Baird, Michael I. Posner (2000). Executive attention and metacognitive regulation.
  95. Zoltán Dienes, Josef Perner (2007). Executive control without conscious awareness: The cold control theory of hypnosis.
  96. Alva Noë (2001). Experience and the active mind.
  97. Thomas W. Polger, Owen J. Flanagan . Explaining the evolution of consciousness: The other hard problem.
  98. Christopher D. Frith, S. J. Blakemore, D. Wolpert (2000). Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action.
  99. Melvin Fitting . Explicit logics of knowledge and conservativity.
  100. Diego Fernandez-Duque, Ian Thornton (2003). Explicit mechanisms do not account for implicit localization and identification of change: An empirical reply to Mitroff et al (2000).
  101. Harold Pashler (1988). Familiarity and visual change detection.
  102. Norbert Schwarz, Gerald L. Clore (1996). Feelings and phenomenal experiences.
  103. Luiz Pessoa, Evan Thompson, Alva Noë (1998). Finding out about filling-in: A guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the philosophy of perception.
  104. Vincian Gaillard, Muriel Vandenberghe, Arnaud Destrebecqz, Axel Cleeremans (2006). First and third-person approaches in implicit learning research.
  105. Axel Cleeremans . Fishing with the wrong nets: How the implicit slips through the representational theory of mind.
  106. P. Rochat (2003). Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in life.
  107. Stephen R. Mitroff, Brian J. Scholl (2005). Forming and updating object representations without awareness: Evidence from motion-induced blindness.
  108. Edward Merrillb, Todd Petersonb . From implicit skills to explicit knowledge: A bottom-up model of skill learning.
  109. J. Feinstein, M. Stein, G. Castillo, M. Paulus (2004). From sensory processes to conscious perception.
  110. Dan Lloyd (2002). Functional MRI and the study of human consciousness.
  111. Alexei V. Samsonovich, Lynn Nadel (2005). Fundamental principles and mechanisms of the conscious self.
  112. Rick Grush, P. Churchland (1995). Gaps in Penrose’s toiling.
  113. Jonathan Grose . Genuine versus deceptive emotional displays.
  114. Antoine Lutz, Jacques Martinerie, Jean-Philippe Lachaux, Francisco J. Varela (2002). Guiding the study of brain dynamics by using first- person data: Synchrony patterns correlate with ongoing conscious states during a simple visual task.
  115. Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sakari Kallio, Antti Revonsuo (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY.
  116. David J. Chalmers (2004). How can we construct a science of consciousness?
  117. Bernard J. Baars, Stan Franklin (2003). How conscious experience and working memory interact.
  118. Bernard J. Baars, Uma Ramamurthy, Stan Franklin (2007). How deliberate, spontaneous, and unwanted memories emerge in a computational model of consciousness.
  119. Axel Cleeremans . How do we know what we are doing?: Time, intention and awareness of action.
  120. Gualtiero Piccinini . How to improve on heterophenomenology: The self-measurement methodology of first-person data.
  121. Paul M. Livingston (2002). Husserl and Schlick on the logical form of experience.
  122. Tim Bayne (2007). Hypnosis and the unity of consciousness.
  123. Axel Cleeremans, Luis Jimenez (2002). Implicit Learning and Consciousness: A Graded, Dynamic Perspective.
  124. Axel Cleeremans . Implicit learning in the presence of multiple cues.
  125. Roger W. Sperry (1975). In search of psyche.
  126. Jeremy Wolfe (1999). Inattentional amnesia.
  127. Christopher Summerfield, Anthony Ian Jack, Adrian Philip Burgess (2002). Induced gamma activity is associated with conscious awareness of pattern masked nouns.
  128. Alain Morin (2003). Inner speech and conscious experience.
  129. Patrick Haggard, S. Clark (2003). Intentional action: Conscious experience and neural prediction.
  130. Danko Georgiev . Interneuronal macroscopic quantum coherence in the brain cortex! The role of the intrasynaptic adhesive proteins beta-neurexin and neuroligin-.
  131. B. Alan Wallace (2001). Intersubjectivity in indo-tibetan buddhism.
  132. Anthony I. Jack, Andreas Roepstorff (2002). Introspection and cognitive brain mapping: From stimulus-response to script-report.
  133. William E. Seager (2000). Introspection and the elementary acts of mind.
  134. Alex Byrne (2005). Introspection.
  135. Peter Carruthers (2010). Introspection: Divided and partly eliminated.
  136. Geoffrey O. Dean, Ivan W. Kelly (2003). Is astrology relevant to consciousness and psi?
  137. Claire Sergent, Stanislas Dehaene (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink.
  138. Jérôme Dokic (2001). Is memory purely preservative?
  139. Elizabeth F. Loftus, M. R. Klinger (1992). Is the unconscious Smart or dumb?
  140. Alva Noë (2002). Is the visual world a grand illusion?
  141. Timothy D. Wilson (2003). Knowing when to ask: Introspection and the adaptive unconscious.
  142. Alain Morin . Language and self-awareness.
  143. Keith Frankish (2002). Language, consciousness, and cross-modular thought.
  144. Alain Morin (2004). Levels of consciousness.
  145. Sid Kouider, Stanislas Dehaene (2007). Levels of processing during non-conscious perception: A critical review of visual masking.
  146. Stanley Klein (2002). Libet’s research on the timing of conscious intention to act: A commentary.
  147. S. A. Klein (2002). Libet’s temporal anomalies: A reassessment of the data.
  148. Stanley Klein (2002). Libet’s timing of mental events: Commentary on the commentaries.
  149. Martin Eimer, Friederike Schlaghecken (2002). Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition: Evidence from masked priming.
  150. E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery, Marc Jeannerod (1997). Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients.
  151. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2004). Making Complexity Simpler: Multivariability and Metastability in the Brain.
  152. Erin A. Heerey, Dacher Keltner, Lisa M. Capps (2003). Making sense of self-conscious emotion: Linking theory of mind and emotion in children with autism.
  153. Yutaka Nakamura, R. Chapman (2002). Measuring pain: An introspective look at introspection.
  154. Philip M. Merikle, M. Daneman (1996). Memory for unconsciously perceived events: Evidence from anesthetized patients.
  155. Stephen Braude . Memory without a trace.
  156. Louis Tinnin (1990). Mental unity, altered states of consciousness, and dissociation.
  157. Werner Ehm (2005). Meta-analysis O mind-matter experiments: A statistical modeling perspective.
  158. Peter Carruthers (2007). Meta-cognition in animals: A skeptical look.
  159. D. Kuhn (2000). Metacognitive development.
  160. Nicholas Shea Æ Cecilia Heyes . Metamemory as evidence of animal consciousness: The type that does the trick.
  161. Sean Draine, Anthony G. Greenwald, Mahzarin R. Banaji (1996). Modeling unconscious gender bias in fame judgments.
  162. David A. Leopold (2003). Motion perception: Read my LIP.
  163. David A. Leopold, Nikos K. Logothetis (1999). Multistable phenomena: Changing views in perception.
  164. D. Maurer, C. Mondloch (2005). Neonatal synesthesia: A re-evaluation.
  165. Robert C. Coghill, John G. McHaffie, Ye-Fen Yen (2003). Neural correlates of interindividual differences in the subjective experience of pain.
  166. Nancy Kanwisher (2001). Neural events and perceptual awareness.
  167. Susan L. Hurley, No (2003). Neural plasticity and consciousness.
  168. Susan L. Hurley, Alva Noe (2003). Neural plasticity and consciousness: Reply to Block.
  169. Hugo D. Critchley, Stefan Wiens, Pia Rotshtein, Arne Öhman, Raymond J. Dolan (2004). Neural systems supporting interoceptive awareness.
  170. Roger W. Sperry (1952). Neurology and the mind-brain problem.
  171. Lutz Antoine, A. Thompson E., Lutz, D. Cosmelli . Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers in cognition and the brain : The philosophy and neuroscience movement.
  172. Rodrick Wallace . New mathematical foundations for AI and alife: Are the necessary conditions for animal consciousness sufficient for the design of intelligent machines?
  173. Daniel T. Levin, D. Alexander Varakin (2004). No pause for a brief disruption: Failures of visual awareness during ongoing events.
  174. Beatrice de Gelder, Nouchine Hadjikhani (2006). Non-conscious recognition of emotional body language.
  175. Raphaël Gaillard, Antoine Del Cul, Lionel Naccache, Fabien Vinckier, Laurent Cohen, Stanislas Dehaene, Edward E. Smith (2006). Nonconscious semantic processing of emotional words modulates conscious access.
  176. Steve Mitroff, Daniel J. Simons, Daniel T. Levin (2004). Nothing compares 2 views: Change blindness results from failures to compare retained information.
  177. Sean Dorrance Kelly . On the demonstration of blindsight in monkeys.
  178. David J. Chalmers (1998). On the search for the neural correlate of consciousness.
  179. Nicholas Humphrey (67). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. Social research, 67, no. 4, 32-39, 2000.
  180. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingerlkurts (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Toward solving the mind-brain problem.
  181. Ned Block (2001). Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness.
  182. Peter King (2003). Parapsychology without the ‘para’ (or the psychology).
  183. John G. Taylor (2002). Paying attention to consciousness.
  184. Anne Treisman, Nancy Kanwisher (1998). Perceiving visually presented objects: Recognition, awareness, and modularity.
  185. Fred Dretske (2006). Perception without awareness.
  186. John B. Dilworth (2006). Perception, introspection, and functional consonance.
  187. John Driver, Patrik Vuilleumier (2001). Perceptual awareness and its loss in unilateral neglect and extinction.
  188. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, Diane Rogers-Ramachandran, Marni Stewart (1992). Perceptual correlates of massive cortical reorganization.
  189. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Carlos F. H. Neves (2009). Phenomenological architecture of a mind and Operational Architectonics of the brain: the unified metastable continuum.
  190. Huping Hu, Maoxin Wu . Photon induced non-local effects of general anaesthetics on the brain.
  191. Henry P. Stapp . Physics in neuroscience.
  192. Bill Brewer (2001). Precis of perception and reason, and response to commentator (michael ayers).
  193. Frank Tong (2003). Primary visual cortex and visual awareness.
  194. Christophe Menant . Proposal for an approach to artificial consciousness based on self-consciousness.
  195. Stefan Linquist (2007). Prospects for a dual inheritance model of emotional evolution.
  196. Roger W. Sperry (1968). Psychobiology and vice versa.
  197. Philip M. Merikle, M. Daneman (1997). Psychological investigations of unconscious perception.
  198. Ulrich Mohrhoff . Psychology all the way down.
  199. Ken Mogi (1997). Qualia and the brain.
  200. Jay David Atlas (2005). Qualia, consciousness, and memory: Dennett (2005), Rosenthal (2002), Ledoux (2002), and Libet (2004).
  201. Gao Shan (2004). Quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication.
  202. Henry P. Stapp (2005). Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: A neurophysical model of mind €“brain interaction.
  203. Lutz Antoine, J. Brefczynski-Lewis, T. Johnstone, R. J. Davidson . Regulation of the neural circuitry of emotion by compassion meditation: Effects of meditative expertise.
  204. Hakwan C. Lau, Richard E. Passingham (2006). Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness.
  205. Sean Draine, Anthony G. Greenwald (1998). Replicable unconscious semantic priming.
  206. Axel Cleeremans . Rules vs. statistics in implicit learning of biconditional grammars.
  207. Daniel J. Simons, Steve Mitroff, Steve Franconeri (2003). Scene perception: What we can learn from visual integration and change detection.
  208. Lynne Rudder Baker . Science and the first-person.
  209. Justin Sytsma . Searching for evidence of phenomenal consciousness in ncc research.
  210. Nicholas Humphrey . Seeing red: A postscript.
  211. Paul Bach-y-Rita, Mitchell Tyler, Kurt Kaczamarek (2003). Seeing with the brain.
  212. Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Chris Frith (2003). Self-awareness and action.
  213. Alain Morin (2005). Self-awareness and the left hemisphere: The dark side of selectively reviewing the literature.
  214. Alain Morin (2002). Self-awareness review part 1: Do you “self-reflect” or “self-ruminate”?
  215. Alain Morin (2003). Self-awareness review part 2: Changing or escaping the self.
  216. Alain Morin (1993). Self-talk and self-awareness: On the nature of the relation.
  217. Joseph R. Manns, Robert E. Clark, Larry R. Squire (2001). Single-cue delay eyeblink conditioning is unrelated to awareness.
  218. Austen Clark (2001). Some logical features of feature integration.
  219. Arnold Trehub (2007). Space, self, and the theater of consciousness.
  220. Ned Block (2003). Spatial perception via tactile sensation.
  221. J. Scott Jordan, Dawn M. McBride (2007). Stable instabilities in the study of consciousness: A potentially integrative prologue?
  222. David A. Leopold, Melanie Wilke, Alexander Maier, Nikos K. Logothetis (2002). Stable perception of visually ambiguous patterns.
  223. Alumit Ishai (2002). Streams of consciousness.
  224. Randolph Blake, Duje Tadin, Kenith V. Sobel, Tony A. Raissian, Sang Chul Chong (2006). Strength of early visual adaptation depends on visual awareness.
  225. Robert J. Howell (2010). Subjectivity and the elusiveness of the self.
  226. Peter Carruthers (2004). Suffering without subjectivity.
  227. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, Diane Rogers-Ramachandran (1996). Synaesthesia in phantom Limbs induced with mirrors.
  228. Nathalie Valenza, Mohamed L. Seghier, Sophie Schwartz, François Lazeyras, Patrik Vuilleumier (2004). Tactile awareness and limb position in neglect: Functional magnetic resonance imaging.
  229. Roger W. Sperry (1995). The Riddle of consciousness and the changing scientific worldview.
  230. John Protevi . The Terri Schiavo case: Empathy, love, sacrifice, singularity.
  231. John Protevi . The Terri schiavo case: Biopolitics and biopower: Agamben and Foucault.
  232. Jesse M. Bering, Todd K. Shackelford (2004). The causal role of consciousness: A conceptual addendum to human evolutionary psychology.
  233. Stephen Grossberg (2004). The complementary brain: From brain dynamics to conscious experiences.
  234. Bernard J. Baars (2002). The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence.
  235. J. McFadden (2002). The conscious electromagnetic information (cemi) field theory: The hard problem made easy?
  236. Jeremy Wolfe (2000). The deployment of visual attention: Two surprises.
  237. S. Klein (1991). The duality of psycho-physics.
  238. Martin Eimer, Angelo Maravita, Jose Van Velzen, Masud Husain, Jon Driver (2002). The electrophysiology of tactile extinction: ERP correlates of unconscious somatosensory processing.
  239. Stuart R. Hameroff (2006). The entwined mysteries of anesthesia and consciousness.
  240. Peter Carruthers (2007). The illusion of conscious will.
  241. F. A. Muller . The implicit definition of the set-concept.
  242. Jordi Fernandez (2006). The intentionality of memory.
  243. Andrew Clifton . The introspection game – or, does the tin man have a heart?
  244. Jeremy Wolfe (2003). The level of attention: Mediating between the stimulus and perception.
  245. Gertrud B. Ujhely (2003). The magical level of consciousness.
  246. Shaun Nichols (2000). The mind’s “I” and the theory of mind’s “I”: Introspection and two concepts of self.
  247. Victor Stenger (1992). The myth of quantum consciousness.
  248. Jaak Panksepp (2000). The neuro-evolutionary cusp between emotions and cognitions: Implications for understanding consciousness and the emergence of a unified mind science.
  249. J. D. Rose (2002). The neurobehavioral nature of fishes and the question of awareness and pain.
  250. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, William Hirstein (1998). The perception of phantom Limbs: The D. O. Hebb lecture.
  251. W. Amiri Prinzmetal, I. Nwachuku, L. Bodanski, L. Blumenfeld (1997). The phenomenology of attention, part 2: Brightness and contrast.
  252. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, Edward M. Hubbard (2003). The phenomenology of synaesthesia.
  253. Alfredo Pereira (2003). The quantum mind-classical brain problem.
  254. Nilli Lavie (2006). The role of perceptual load in visual awareness.
  255. Pierre Perruchet, Annie Vinter (2002). The self-organizing consciousness.
  256. Harald Atmanspacher . The significance of causally coupled, stable neuronal assemblies for the psychological time arrow.
  257. Stephen R. Mitroff, Daniel J. Simons, Steven Franconeri (2002). The siren song of implicit change detection.
  258. J. Campbell (1997). The structure of time in autobiographical memory.
  259. Frank H. Durgin, Saul Sternberg (2002). The time of consciousness and vice versa.
  260. David M. Rosenthal (2002). The timing of conscious states.
  261. Frank H. Durgin (2002). The tinkerbell effect: Motion, perception and illusion.
  262. Susan M. Andersen, Inga Reznik, Noah S. Glassman (2005). The unconscious relational self.
  263. Nicholas Shea, Tim Bayne . The vegetative state and the science of consciousness.
  264. Anil K. Seth, Gerald M. Edelman, Eugene I. Izhikevich, George N. Reeke (2006). Theories and measures of consciousness: An extended framework.
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