| Precis of Action in Perception |
| Alva Noe |
| Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception |
| Jesse Prinz |
| Reply to Zahavi: The Value of Historical Scholarship |
| Thomas Metzinger |
| Sensorimotor Activity |
| Mark Rowlands |
| Vision as Dance? Three Challenges for Sensorimotor Contingency Theory |
| Andy Clark |
| Why Visual Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted |
| Pierre Jacob |
| Unconscious subjectivity |
| Joseph U. Neisser |
| Enactive Intentionality |
| William G. Lycan |
| Is the Appearance of Shape Protean? |
| Charles Siewert |
| Reply to Ghin: Self-Sustainment on the Level of Global Availability |
| Thomas Metzinger |
| Reply to Himma: Personal Identity and Cartesian Intuitions |
| Thomas Metzinger |
| Reply to Hobson: Can there be a First-Person Science of Consciousness? |
| Thomas Metzinger |
| Reply to Legrand: Content from the Inside Out |
| Thomas Metzinger |
| Reply to Livet: Meta-abeyance? |
| Thomas Metzinger |
| Reply to Weisberg: No direction home—searching for neutral ground |
| Thomas Metzinger |
| A Place for Dogs and Trees? |
| Thomas W. Polger |
| A Place for Protoconsciousness? |
| Yujin Nagasawa |
| Does Synesthesia Undermine Representationalism? |
| Torin Alter |
| Doubts About Receptivity |
| William S. Robinson |
| Panexperientialism, Cognition, and the Nature of Experience |
| Amy Kind |
| Rosenberg on Causation |
| Jennifer McKitrick |
| Rosenberg, Reducibility and Consciousness |
| William Seager |
